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ISOLATING THE MALE BIAS AGAINST
REFORM OF ABORTION LEGISLATION
PROLOGUE
The time: 1984; the place: California State Assembly; and
Miss Onrush, Majority Party Speaker, addresses the assembled
legislators in respect to an impending bill, the enactment of which
is a foregone conclusion.
And thus the revised version of California Penal Code section
2751 passed easily, albeit not exactly unanimously, into California
law. The lone dissenter from Orange County tried to draw personal
attention to his charming person by registering a protest to an
eager newswoman, but he quickly regained his gentlemanly com-
posure after a sharp reminder that his presence was not so much
one of necessity as it was an expression of the Majority Party's
democratic intentions toward those of his sex. As the only male
serving in elected capacity he was quick to see the point.
The revised bill reads as follows:*
"Any man who solicits of any person any antibiotic or anti-
biotic substance, and takes the same, or submits to the administra-
1 Prior to its partial amendment in 1967, CAL. PEN. CODE § 275 (West 1955) read
as follows: "Every woman who solicits of any person any medicine, drug, or sub-
stance whatever, and takes the same, or who submits to any operation, or to the
use of any means whatever, with intent thereby to procure a miscarriage, unless the
same is necessary to preserve her life, is punishable by imprisonment in the State
Prison not less than one nor more than five years."
The statute rested essentially without change since its inception in 1872. In 1967
the statute was amended: "unless the same is necessary to preserve her life" is de-
leted and "except as provided in the Therapeutic Abortion Act, Chapter 11 (commenc-
ing with Section 25950) of Division 20 of the Health and Safety Code." is added.
CAL. PEN. CODE § 275 (West Supp. 1968). The Therapeutic Abortion Act extends the
lawful grounds for obtaining an abortion, the major thrust of which is to deem an
abortion justifiable if necessary to preserve the mother's health. CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 25950-54 (West Supp. 1968).
See generally CAL. PEN. CODE § 274 (West Supp. 1968), which is essentially the
same in its terminology but directed at the person performing the abortion. This was
likewise revised in 1967 by the Therapeutic Abortion Act; and CAL. PEN CODE § 276
(West Supp. 1968) directed at a party who solicits a woman to submit to an abortion;
this section was revised in the same fashion by the Therapeutic Abortion Act.
* Legislative History: The legislature, after reviewing Dr. Feminina's
brilliant research revealing that antibiotics affect spermatozoa, decided
it was in the best interests of the public health, morals and welfare to
enact the revised statute. Men have not had the right to vote since
1980; that this fact has a bearing upon the enactment of this statute
is merely conjectural, even though the relinquishment of this right was
not without some skirmish.
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tion of an antibiotic during his procreative years regardless of his
intent thereby to preserve his health (unless he has been, prior
to the administration of the drug, rendered infertile by an event
beyond his control) is punishable by imprisonment in the state
prison not less than one nor more than five years."
THE SUBJECT: REFORM OF ABORTION LEGISLATION
The horrors of overpopulation have at last invaded the con-
sciousness of the average American. He is now willing to cast his
embarrassed eye upon a topic, the discussion of which invites a spec-
trum of comment ranging from "Abortion! A murder in the womb
.... "I to "I refuse to permit anyone's interference with the dispo-
sition of my own body in its most intimate and basic functions....
Emotionalism, rather than intellectualism, is more closely re-
lated to the act of terminating an unwanted pregnancy. This is not
the case when the average person evaluates the other kinds of un-
natural termination of human life. Defense of family and self from
imminent physical harm, defense of country, and punishment for
a capital offense sometimes lead to the deliberate extinction of
human life; the unemotional eyes of the criminal law regard these
killings as justifiable homicide.4
Because of this emotional response to the subject matter of
abortion, it is more proper that the former (the response) rather
than the latter (the subject matter evoking it) should be investi-
gated. Hopefully this investigation will silhouette those factors
militating against a woman's exercise of free will respecting the
regulation of her own procreative processes.
The benefits to be derived from abortion legislation reform
are two-fold, and both are equal in their importance. The general-
ized benefit to society in eliminating a legal barrier to a voluntary
means of population control' is no more important than that specific
benefit conferred upon the individual woman whose privacy in her
sexual life is sorely in need of protection.
2 Address by Father Donald Duggan to the Conference on Population Explosion,
The Institute for the Study of Health and Society, November 20, 1969, Airlie House,
Warrenton, Virginia. Author of this Comment attended as invitee.
3 As a woman and a mother, the author does not hesitate to so state; the sig-
nificance of this statement will not be diminished by permitting it to issue from the
lips of an itinerant fruit picker, nor will its meaning be enhanced by attributing it
to Simone de Beauvoire.
4 R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 33 (2d ed. 1969).




THE LAW: ITS ORIGIN IN THE UNITED STATES
Restrictions placed upon a woman's power to govern her unique
procreative processes are expressed predominantly through legis-
lation, and additional prominence is conferred upon such legislation
by its incorporation into the penal codes of every state. A survey
of all the codes is contained within the graduate thesis of Harvey
Ziff.6 His annotative analysis of the codes is complete,7 and thus
no effort is herein made to duplicate his efforts.
A prohibition on abortion of the not yet "quickened" fetus
became a part of the criminal law of England as recently as 1803.8Prior to that time the common law was silent on this issue, as were
the laws of the states. When the law punishing an abortion first
arrived in the United States, an abortion prior to quickening was
not within its embrace, and not until 1860 was an abortion made
a crime regardless of whether or not the fetus had quickened.9 It
must be noted that an abortion was (and still is) legally justifiable
in those circumstances where the life of the mother is thereby pre-
served, and, as Ziff points out, most abortion statutes read sim-
ilarly today.
THE LAW As IT RELATES TO THE HISTORY OF WOMEN'S STATUS
Even though the thrust of this investigation is directed at dis-
covering the psychological underpinnings of the law, it is appropri-
ate to include a recounting of woman's historical role in the develop-
ment of the social hierarchy. History points up the absurdity of
present-day application of abortion laws which reflect a social order
of the past.
It has been almost a universal characteristic of western civiliza-
tions that religious and secular regulation of the physiological con-
sequences of a woman's sexual life arose without her participation
in either their formulation or judicial application. Why is this so?
Why has she, the subject of such intrusive regulation, had so little
to say or do in shaping her own life and that of her daughters? A
biological viewpoint provides a satisfactory platform from which
to launch the answers to these questions.
In comparison with contemporary standards, a woman of the
6 Ziff, Recent Abortion Law Reforms (Or Much Ado About Nothing), 60 J.
CRIX. L.C. & P.S. 1, 3 (1969).
7 Id. at 4.
8 Pilpel & Norwick, When Should Abortion Be Legal? (Public Affairs Pamphlet
no. 429, 1969). See R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW, 140-49 (2d ed. 1969).
9 Pilpel & Norwick, supra note 8, at 3.
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not too distant past was an entity almost totally governed by the
demands of her own biology, and compared to her brothers she
was a creature of physical infirmity; her lifespan was comparatively
short, of an approximate duration of thirty-five years, and often-
times terminated in childbirth if not the plague." For most of her
life a woman was pregnant. Without housekeeping devices she was
fully occupied with the task of reproduction and the acts ancillary
thereto, such as child care, nursing and cooking. In such a state,
unable to fend for herself beyond the confines of her domestic
environment, woman was the natural recipient of protection and
sympathy, and because she was of such valuable use, she was the
natural target of control.
Measuring her life in these terms, it was easy to arrive at a
firm conviction that a woman's biology was her destiny. Her role
was so firmly crystallized within the Judeo-Christian ethic that
she accepted herself as having been designed to fit into the order
of existence as a sessile, secondary being, a servant of man as well
as God. It is not surprising that the pedestal became the ultimate
and most appropriate destination of such a thoroughly immobilized
entity.
When the advances in medicine spared woman from the in-
cursions of puerperal fever," extended her lifespan and freed her
from her biological chains (and in fact enabled her to outlive her
mate by a few years), she then realized that a greater proportion
of her life was newly available for pursuits unrelated to the per-
petuation of the species.
A NEED FOR REFORM
Times change, and they change faster than the rules and laws
flowing from them-probably because the former are a product
of the interaction of both chance and choice, while the latter are
the handiwork of man's intellectual processes and hence are guarded
by his conceit from reflecting a change of circumstances. Thus we
have the creation of The Establishment which in turn stimulates
creation of a counterforce directed toward its own reformation.
We are in the latter stage today; there is an almost overly
acute dissection, intellectually and emotionally, of the intricate
10 J. NoHL, THE BLAcx DEATH, A CHmONICLE OF THE PLAGUE (1960).
11 See generally, J. LUCAS-DUBRETON, THE BORGIAS (1954); H. L. GREDE, THE
GIrT oF LIFE (1956) (a biography of I. Semmelweiss, the discoverer of the vector in
puerperal fever) ; F. G. SLAUGHTER, IMMORTAL MAGYAR (1950) (a biography of Sem-
melweiss); I. GALDSTON, PREVENTION OF MATERNAL DEATHS (1937).
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interdependence of law and morality and the environment within
which both exist. 12 People are questioning the quality and extent
of their relationships with each other as well as with The Establish-
ment, and they do so with the expectation that there must be
changes made today rather than tomorrow.
Women, no longer estranged from the mainstream of life, de-
mand a change in the rules and customs governing their relation-
ship to the American scene so that they can make a productive
and positive investment of that greater portion of their lives which
is no longer devoted to family oriented activity."
This demand for reform extends to the subject of abortion
legislation. Since any reform on this subject is in the direction of
enlarging a woman's freedom of choice in determining whether or
not she will produce a child, it is a bit startling that there exists
a vocal minority of women who would resist all reform in this arena
-this despite the fact that they well know or ought to know that
such reform is permissive and does not in any degree compel
affirmative action that might be contrary to the direction of their
own consciences. Future research will no doubt pinpoint the under-
lying nature of this resistance; however, this interesting dilemma
is not of present concern. Herein the attention is focussed upon:
THE MEN
Do men resist reform of abortion legislation? Assuming that
they do, why is this so? What reason might they have for resisting
the complete elimination of a criminal statute which has the effect
of penalizing a small portion of the citizenry for the unwanted
12 In respect to the interdependence of law and morality it is interesting to note
the opinions of Eugene Quay on this relationship. In voicing his opposition to adop-
tion of section 230 of the Model Penal Code, dealing with reform of abortion legis-
lation, Quay states that adoption of the law on abortion as restated by the American
Law Institute would pave the way toward widespread immoral conduct, in that such
a code represents a departure from objective truth. He then goes on to say "Legisla-
tive adoption of this section would not leave its opponents undisturbed in their own
way of life. The mere fact of affirmative approval of therapeutic abortion by a legis-
lature would change the views and practices of millions who earnestly try to shape
their lives to a moral code, but who look to their lawmakers to define it for them."Quay, Justifiable Abortion-Medical and Legal Foundations (pts. 1, 2), 49 GEO. L.J.
173, 395 at 441 (1960-61).
Evidently Quay believes that those responsible for the creation of a law must
employ circular reasoning because of the linear effects of the product of such thought.
In light of the non-compelling nature of the proposed legislation, his thoughts upon
the nature of its effects seem totally inappropriate.
13 See 8 RAMPARTS 57 (Dec., 1969) (Marlene Dixon, the author, is a professor of
sociology at McGill University. Her article is an excellent summation of the forces
now in motion leading to the popular establishment of the Women's Liberation Move-
ment); Komisar, The New Feminism, SATURDAY REVIEW (Feb. 21, 1970).
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consequences of a sexual act? Such a state of affairs is absurd
when viewed in the light shed by recent court decisions determining
that the "marital act" is a basic right and thus protected from the
prying eyes of the state.'4
THE CHURCH
Men do harbor a negative response to the suggestion that per-
haps only a woman should have the right to determine whether or
not she shall remain pregnant. 5
Oftentimes the expression of this negative attitude is ascribed
to a blind adherence to religious dogma (with the consequence that
an attack is launched against the religious establishment itself
rather than upon the psychological and sociological basis of the
resistance to change). The male's failure to permit his sexual equal
the same opportunity to exercise freedom of choice in matters sexual
as he himself enjoys does not necessarily originate in the church.
It is easy to think otherwise since the church is one of several in-
stitutions which sanctify the greater privileges of the male.
That which is sought to be shown here is the existence of a
basic psychological principle underlying the male viewpoint and
expressed through several different mediums of social organization.
The church, as one of these mediums, is not the sole creator of
prejudice so much as it is one of the most intransigent mediums
through which it is expressed.
THE SURVEY
Many authorities believe the written survey to be one of the
best means by which to identify and describe a psychological fac-
tor at work in a large group of interviewees. The factor sought
here is one which would explain male resistance to reform in the
area of abortion legislation, and so, of course, the survey was ad-
ministered only to men.
14 In reaffirming the right to privacy in the marital relationship, the Supreme
Court of the United States examines the Bill of Rights in reiteration of the specific
guarantees set forth therein and declares that each one of them creates a penumbra:
an emanation proceeds from these guarantees and serves to make each one of them
a real factor in defining our basic rights. Squarely within this zone of protection is
the marital relationship, which is ". . . a right of privacy older than the Bill of
Rights .... ." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484, 486 (1965). Accord, Skinner
v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536, 541 (1942), wherein the Court declared that marriage
and procreation involve a basic liberty. See also People v. Belous, 71 A.C. 996, 458
P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969).
15 See Table 1 showing only 15 men out of 72 selecting statute number 1 ad-
vocating elimination of all statutory restrictions on obtaining an abortion.
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The survey consists of two pages,1" one of which is a question-
naire requesting the usual information about the interviewee's age,
education and background; however the most important informa-
tion sought reveals the man's preference in respect to his offspring:
Their age, sex and number. The second page lists six statutes on
the subject of abortion legislation; they represent the gradient from
liberality: Number 1, to conservatism: Number 6. The interviewee
is directed to choose the one statute he prefers.
METHOD OF SAMPLING
The interviewer was stationed in a heavily travelled shopping
mall' 7 so that the men stepping within a designated target area
were within her view. All men who stepped within this area did so
by chance and thus became the subjects who were asked to spend
a few minutes filling out a questionnaire. Most men so requested
evidenced pleasure at being stopped and appeared to enjoy filling
out the survey. In this fashion eighty-five interviews' were ob-
tained, and the data gathered as a result of their cooperation is
tabulated below.
A test run of the survey on several male law students con-
vincingly indicated that they could not see, from the face of the
questionnaire, that the major information sought was the correla-
tion of liberality in selection of abortion legislation with fulfillment
of male heirship demands of each male interviewee.' 9
THESIS UNDERLYING THE SURVEY
The theory underlying the construction of the questionnaire
is more readily understandable in light of the following: A survey of
abortion legislation enacted (and having as its purpose the regula-
tion of the means by which a woman can control her fecundity)
reveals the-same to be the product of legislatures composed almost
18 See APPENDix infra at 316.
17 The shopping center selected is centrally located, and is patronized by a broad
cross-section of economic classes; the selection of this particular shopping center was
thought to be the best for purposes of obtaining a random sample of the male
population, especially so, since it was the Christmas shopping season when men are
most apt to be patronizing a center of this kind.
18 Although this sample is not of the magnitude associated with statistical con-
clusiveness, the relative uniformity of the results indicates a disposition toward con-
clusiveness. Because of this, the study serves as a pilot program for a more exhaustive
study to be undertaken at a later date and made possible by a grant.
19 Questions 7-1 through 7-4 were added to the survey so that a different com-plexion would be imparted to the questionnaire and to obscure the purpose of cor-
relating offspring with preferred legislation.
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entirely of men.20 Whatever form it took, this type of legislation
had its origination and was enacted many years prior to the estab-
lishment of women's suffrage.2'
Because of the nature and circumstances surrounding the
establishment of abortion legislation (e.g., the exclusion of women
from public life and hence from governmental and judicial bodies
and the non-existence of channels through which women could ex-
press a political opinion) the enacted legislation uniformly pre-
cludes the incorporation of a woman's judgment on the subject of
early termination of pregnancy. These same circumstances also
give substance to the proposition that abortion statutes are more
expressive of the male attitude towards procreation than has here-
tofore been recognized. Thus the underlying premise structuring the
questionnaire is one which points out that legislation restricting the
freedom to terminate an unwanted pregnancy reflects a bias in
favor of the male's conceptualization of his own procreative im-
pulses. The historical circumstances within which the law was
formulated permitted an unobstructed and unmitigated expression
of this bias in the law as well as in other institutions. It is this
author's thesis that the bias is composed of the following constel-
lation of psychological factors:
A man desires the perpetuation of his own self, and not merely
in abstract terms; he desires a male heir above a female because
he does not regard the female as being a totally satisfactory ex-
pression of his own self. This "replication of self" is one of the
most basic goals of the male parent, and he does not wish to permit
his mate the power to infringe upon its fulfillment; hence he will
do what he can to ensure her cooperation.
One of the ways he secures this cooperation, now that appli-
cation of brute force has passed the way of trial by combat, is by
legally restricting her right to terminate a pregnancy at will. Legis-
lation provides the means to serve this end.
22
The survey was composed so as to reveal the existence of this
premise as a psychological operative. If it existed and was op-
erating, the response on the part of the male participant would
reveal a direct relationship between the presence and number of
male offspring born to each interviewee and the degree of liberality
20 A. HIBBARD, WOMEN IN GOVERNMENT 141 (1961).
21 U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (giving women the right to vote, enacted in 1920).
This amendment was enacted 50 years after the first version of CAL. PEN. CODE
§ 274 (West 1955), as amended CAL. PEN. CODE § 274 (West Supp. 1968) (making
abortion a felony).
22 Supra, note 1.
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in his choice of abortion legislation. In other words, the more male
children a man had, the more "self" he would thus realize, with
the result that he should be more willing to grant his spouse (and
other females) a greater freedom from an unwanted pregnancy
than would a male whose demand for male heirs is unfulfilled. Con-
sequently, this willingness would be expressed by his preference
for more enlightened rather than punitive abortion legislation.
INTERPRETATION OF DATA
The principle sought to be illustrated by the data is one of a
direct relationship between the degree of liberality expressed toward
abortion legislation reform and the fulfillment of a desire for male
heirs. The results, as gathered in Table 1,23 do show a strong trend
toward support of the thesis that a man will relax his grip upon
his mate's freedom from unwanted pregnancy as his needs for
male heirship are met.2 4 There are several reasons why the results
were not more exaggerated:
1. The parameter of selection as between the statutes was
reduced as a function of the participants' own behavior;
no one selected either one of the two most stringent statutes
-number 5 and number 6. Thus the degree of liberality, or
lack of it, had to be distributed between four rather than
six statutes. It is important to note that the most conserva-
tive selection made was thus number 4, which is a close
paraphrase of section 274 of California Penal Code, and that
83.5 percent of the participants prefer legislation more
liberal than is presently controlling.
2. Of the eighty-five men interviewed, thirteen had no chil-
dren, and hence their preference for ideal family composi-
tion and the relationship of such to abortion statutes may
23 See text at page 311, infra.
24 D. Chappell and P.R. Wilson conducted a survey of public attitudes toward
the reform of the law relating to abortion. After categorizing the response in terms of
age and sex, they found that in the younger age groups more women than men
favored abortion, and that in the older age groups, the situation was reversed. The
authors suggested that the greater liberality in attitude of the younger women reflected
their enjoyment of a greater degree of emancipation than their elders. They offered
no explanation for their finding that 55 percent of the younger men as compared to
65 percent of the older men favored abortion. Chappell & Wilson, Public Attitudes to
the Reform of The Law Relating to Abortion and Homosexuality, 42 AusTL. L.J.
120, 125 (1968).
Perhaps the psychological factors herein described as operating in relation to a
man's preference for abortion legislation were also evidenced and reflected in the
statistics gathered by Chappell and Wilson. As the men grew older their procreative
drives toward providing themselves with a male heir would be more apt to be fulfilled
than those of the younger men.
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not properly be included in the data compilation along
with the information given by male parents. Perhaps a
restriction to male parents as survey subjects would throw
the principle into greater relief as larger sampling groups
are gathered.
3. Another factor seems to be operating, and it might be
obscuring the clarity of expression of the aforementioned
thesis. The compilation of data suggests that as the family
size exceeds a certain limit (generally four children) the
relationship of male heirship fulfillment and liberalized
legislation seems to disappear as an identifiable factor;
in its place appears a direct relationship between family
size and liberalized legislation. Perhaps abortion is asso-
ciated with family planning to a greater degree by men
with large families than by men with only one or two
children.
EccE SIGNUM I
The survey results are interesting in themselves apart from
the possibilities of correlation with legislation. For instance, the
optimum family size departs from that standard sought to be
established by such organizations as Planned Parenthood and Zero
Population Growth. The former would be disturbed while the lat-
ter would be horrified to see that out of seventy-two male parents,
forty-seven of them (65 per cent) have three or more children. If
family size is to remain a matter of individual conscience, as almost
all social institutions tenuously agree that it now is, then organiza-
tions like Planned Parenthood have their work cut out for them
to reduce the demands of the conscience to a size that can be
accommodated by the planet's finite resources. 21
As mentioned previously, the results support the thesis that
a male has a preference for male offspring and that his regard as
to what the law ought to be in respect to the regulation of abortion
varies directly and according to the degree to which he realizes his
urge for male heirs. Reference to Table 1 shows that statutory
preference is uniformly more conservative for men who have off-
spring entirely or predominantly female; this is seen, for instance,
by reading the table in the case of preference for statute number 1.
Men with families composed of "all girls" failed to select this
25 See Table 2 illustrating the unmarried males' preference for a family of at
least three. Planned Parenthood hopes to educate the public to accept two children as
the upper limit on family size.
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SURVEY RESULTS: TABULATION OF DATA
TABLE 1
NUMBER IN EACH COLUMN REPRESENTS FREQUENCY OF SELECTION OF ASTATUTE; EACH STATUTE HAS THE SAME DESIGNATING NUMERAL As IN THE SURVEY
Gender characteristic of Statute selected *number ofeach male parent's offspring. # 1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 informants
All girls 0 3 4 4 0 0 11More girls than boys 2 2 9 6 0 0 19Equal number of each sex 5 7 2 1 0 0 15All boys 4 10 0 0 0 0 14More boys than girls 4 7 2 0 0 0 13
Total is 29 17 11 0 0 72
Percent 21% 40% 24% 15% 0 0 100%
* This category does not include the informants who have no offspring.
TABLE 2
NUMBER IN EACH COLUMN REPRESENTS FREQUENCY OF SELECTION OF ASTATUTE; EACH STATUTE HAS THE SAME DESIGNATING NUMERAL As IN THE SURVEY
Family composition:
Gender characteristic
preferred by each male Statute selected number of
non-parent. #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 informants
All girls 0 0 0 0 0 0 0More girls than boys 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Equal number of each sex **1 0 0 0 0 0 1All boys 0 1 0 0 0 0 1More boys than girls 0 4 4 3 0 0 11
Total 1 5 4 3 0 0 13
Percent 8% 38% 31% 23% 0% 0% 100%
** One interviewee, married, but without children, reported that he really didn't
care what he had as long as there were no more than two, and all he hopedwas that they were healthy. His inclusion into the category of "equal number
of each sex" is the best compromise.
statute, while men with families composed of "all boys" selected
statute number 1 in four out of fourteen cases.
The same information in respect to the other three statutes
can be derived by reading the tables in a similar fashion.
Table 2 tabulates the results from males without children. The
childless males exhibit a slightly more conservative preference thandid the male parents. Perhaps this is a sign of lack of experience
with child rearing, as well as an indication that they are less apt
to regard abortion as a method of family planning than would a
man with seven children to support. The preference for male heirsis clearly demonstrated, since twelve out of thirteen men express
a desire for all male or mostly male offspring.
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STATUTORY REFORM
Not only is there a need, there is a demand for statutory re-
form which has not been adequately and equitably met in California.
Ziff points out the danger of partial reform, which is what we
now have with the incorporation of the Therapeutic Abortion Act
into the Penal Code. He finds inculcated within the minds of med-
ical practitioners an "abortion mentality which develops concomitant
with partial legalization [of abortions] and which is likely to
strengthen the resolve of individual physicians to follow their own
best judgment."26 He adds that this partially corrected law does not
achieve the end of decreasing illegal abortions and that, instead,
illegal abortions are increased both in and out of the hospital. There
is a continued lack of enforcement of the new law, or worse yet,
a sporadic enforcement that keeps doctors and their patients
trembling on the brink of what is for them a terrible legal abyss.
The recent California decision, reciting the existence of a
woman's constitutional rights to life and to choose whether to bear
children, is no substitute for legislative reform. In this decision,
People v. Belous,27 the court declared that:
The fundamental right of the woman to choose whether to bear chil-
dren follows from the Supreme Court's and this court's repeated ac-
knowledgment of a "right of privacy" or "liberty" in matters related to
marriage, family and sex.
That such a right [of choice] is not enumerated in either the
United States or California Constitutions is no impediment to the ex-
istence of the right.
28
Beautiful as these words might be to a doctor prosecuted for
acting in accord with the way he sees his duty to his patient, these
words lack the power to stay the hand of a district attorney deter-
mined to prosecute. In fact, he might be forced to prosecute; 29 and
if he chooses to prosecute, the district attorney need obey only the
dictates of the legislature as long as the criminal law is on the
26 Ziff, supra note 6 at 14.
27 71 A:C. 996, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969). Dr. Belous recommended
a skilled abortionist to a patient who threatened to commit suicide or go to Mexico
and gamble with her life. For this act he was convicted of abortion under the pre-1967
version of CAL. PEN. 'CODE § 274 (West 1955), as amended, CAL. PEN. CODE § 274
(West Supp. 1968) and conspiracy to commit the felony under CAL. PEN. CODE § 182
(West 1955), as amended, CAL. PEN. CODE (West Supp. 1968). The defendant regarded
his act as necessary in light of his understanding of the meaning of the phrase
"[N]ecessary to preserve the life of the mother .... " The district attorney disagreed
with his understanding and prosecuted.
28 71 A.C. 996 at 1005-06, 458 P.2d 194 at 200, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 at 359-60 (citing
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965)).
29 State v. Langley, 214 Ore. 445, 323 P.2d 301 (1958).
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books. It is only partial relief to the accused parties that they shall
eventually receive relief in the higher courts of the state.
The concept of a society ordered by the law is irremediably
damaged when the law itself becomes a source of harassment and
confusion as a result of its inconsistent application. For these
reasons, the criminal statutes restricting a woman's freedom to
determine whether she shall bear a child must be either revised or
taken completely out of the area of criminal law.
THREE STEPS FORWARD AND Two BACK: WHY?
The conclusions derived from this author's survey might ex-
plain the motives for the adoption by the California legislature of
the halfway measures incorporated by the American Law Institute
into section 230.3 of the Model Penal Code." California modeled
its therapeutic abortion revision after the Model Code and attached
it to section 274 of the Penal Code."
The existence of a bias favoring males and the procreation
of male heirs can probably be demonstrated in any all-male group.
Why, then, would not the same bias be controlling in our almost
all-male legislature, now challenged to serve up a better law? It
probably is operating either consciously or unconsciously in the
minds of the congressional representatives who, even though they are
sworn to serve all of their constituents, nevertheless favor their
own sex.
This bias, composed of the psychological factors already de-
scribed, serves as a brake upon the collective action of this partic-
ular group of men, just as it would on any other group of men.
The legislators disguise their reticence with declarations that the
public is not ready to accept such advanced legislation. That this
is a too conservative estimation of their constituents' temper is
evidenced by the data which clearly shows that 83.5 per cent of the
men polled would enact, if they could, legislation "liberalized" to a
greater degree than that which is presently in effect.
In failing to recognize and thus compensate for this gender-
related bias the legislators are breaching a duty of impartiality
owed to their female constituents, in addition to discriminating
against them by creating legislation infringing upon a woman's
most fundamental rights. This latter point raises a constitutional
issue to be dealt with next.
30 MODEL PENAL 'CODE § 230.3 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).




One of the impediments to the'revision or elimination of abor-
tion legislation is the difficulty attendant upon resolving whether
or not the fetus has any rights32 and if so, whether they are within
the embrace of the Bill of Rights of both the state and the nation.3
Why there is so much attention devoted to the rights of the
fetus rather than to those of its living and unwilling mother is a
fascinating discussion but beyond the scope of this paper; neverthe-
less, the product of this exclusive focus has crystallized into the
usual scientific and philosophical analyses of the origin of life, its
meaning, its inviolability and whether life is concurrent with con-
ception or only when the embryo is recognizably human. This author
believes that discussion of fetal rights in relation to present abortion
legislation is futile because present legislation is in itself unconsti-
tutional on a different basis.
To illustrate the unconstitutionality of the criminal law as ap-
plied to the unwilling pregnant woman, a comparison is made of
her position to that of the Negro defendant in Strauder v. West
Virginia.8 4 The woman who prefers an escape from the rigors of
childbirth for reasons other than those pertaining to her life and
health and who thereby subjects herself to the penalties of the
criminal law, stands in a legal position similar to that of the Negro,
Strauder, indicted for murder and tried before an all-white jury.
The Court held that the defendant's rights guaranteed to him
by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment had
been denied because he was precluded, solely because of his race,
from receiving a fair trial before a jury of his peers, since the
law of his state excluded all Negroes from the right of serving
on a jury. 5
The language used in striking down the West Virginia statute
can be paraphrased without distorting the essence of its meaning,
thus providing a tool with which to strike down section 274 of the
California Penal Code. In doing so, it must be held in mind that the
California anti-abortion statute was enacted in 1870, prior to the
establishment of woman's legal capacity to act and participate
politically. The court said:
32 Ziff, supra, note 6 at 16.
33 Ziff, supra, note 6 at 14; See generally People v. Belous, 71 A.C. 996, 1020, 458
P.2d 194, 209, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 369 (1969) (dissenting opinion).
84 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
35 Id. at 304.
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The very fact that colored people [women] are singled out and
expressly denied by a statute all right to participate in the administra-
tion [enactment] of the law . . . because of their color [sex] though
they are citizens, and may be in other respects fully qualified, is prac-
tically a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their
inferiority, and a stimulant to that race [sexual] prejudice which is an
impediment to securing to individuals of the race [sex] that equal
justice which the law aims to secure to all others.8 6
The condition of the Negro who has been denied the equal
protection of the law as a matter of his race is directly analogous
to the condition of the woman who has been barred, by virtue of her
sex, from directly participating in the formulation and application
of a law which has its most severe effects only upon the members
of her sex. The double irony: To be punished for being a woman
under a law created in the absence of women's assent.
The results of this survey show a bias in favor of male interests
at the cost of those that are uniquely female. This bias is gender-
related and thus is presumed to have existed at that time when
only men had political rights and legislative capacities; therefore
the statute enacted by male legislators at a time prior to the estab-
lishment of women's political rights is unconstitutional not only
because the law denies a woman her human rights, 7 but also
because the statute as it now stands denies to the woman the equal
protection of the law.
Solely as a matter of her sex, a woman has been denied, and
continues to be denied, the equal protection of the law as a function
(1) of being denied the right to participate in the statute's formula-
tion," (2) of being effectively denied the opportunity of administer-
ing the law because of the preponderance of males in high (if not
almost all) administrative positions, 89 and (3) of being educated
to accept the role of victim in the furtherance of male interests 0
which are often in opposition to those of women.
CONCLUSION
Assuming that the desire for a male heir is, in the male, an
impulse towards replication or enlargement of "self," then the data
36 Id. at 308.
37 Cf. People v. Belous, 71 A.C. 996 at 1005, 458 P.2d 194 at 200, 80 Cal. Rptr.
354 at 359 (1969).
38 See note 21, supra.
39 See Woman's Place, 225 THE ATLANTIC 81-126 (Mar., 1970). ATNic devotes
a special issue to a report of women's views of their status. Diane Schulder, a New
York attorney, reviews the relationship of women to the law and points to the dis-
advantageous position of women in relation to it. In this same issue, Catherine
Drinker Bowen (an eminent biographer of men in the law) notes that out of one
hundred members of the United States Senate, only one is a woman.
40 The most basic of which is sought to be shown by this study.
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collected and tabulated points to the existence of a bias composed
of the psychological factors previously described. It is possible to
conclude that for the majority of men interviewed, this bias is
present and does operate in relation to their preference for legisla-
tion restricting the availability of an abortion to a pregnant woman.4
Of special import to legislators is the information herein pro-
vided that not one interviewee would accept any statute more
stringent than number 4, which is almost a direct paraphrase of
present-day California legislation.42 In fact, legislation of a more
enlightened nature is preferred by 85 per cent of all male parents
and by 83.5 per cent of all men interviewed.43
Patricia E. Kowitz
APPENDIX
Please Do Not Sign This Questionnaire
Answer the following questions by placing a mark or response in the ap-
propriate space. You are welcome to make any comment on the reverse side.
1. AGE: under 21. 21 to 35_. 35 to 46 . 46 to 60._ over 60.
2. FORMAL EDUCATION: (indicate highest level completed)
Jr. High School_..... High School. 2 Yr. College- Post-graduate-
4 Yr. College
3. MARITAL STATUS: never married _- divorced/separated
widower__ married - How many times
married
4. ARMED SERVICES: If you have served in any branch of the armed
services please check this space-, then answer
the following:
Served in combat zone?: YES__ NO_____
5. DO YOU HAVE ANY CHILDREN? YES__ NO___ If answer is
yes, then complete the following: (include all living offspring)
5-1 number of children
5-2 age of oldest child
5-3 sex of oldest child
5-4 number of boys
5-5 number of girls
41 See Table 1: No man would select a statute having as one of its effects the
interference with the integrity of a woman's life or health.
42See note 1, supra.
43 See Table 1.
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5-6 Are you satisfied with the present composition of your family
in terms of: (Answer yes or no.)
YES NO
The number of children you have......
The number of boys.................
The number of girls.................
The order of appearance of each child in
respect to its sex...................
6. If you have no children OR if you answered NO to any part of 5-6, then
answer what would be for you, the ideal number of children:_
the ideal number of children of each sex:-BOY(S) -GIRL(S)
the ideal order of appearance of each child in respect to sex:
(e.g., boy, boy, girl, boy.)
7. PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING:
7-1. As a child, I sometimes wished I was a member of the opposite sex:
YES:-, NO:__ .
7-2. If women are given too much authority they lose their femininity:
(check one) AGREE__ UNDECIDED__ DISAGREE__
7-3. There are few famous or important women artists or scientists because
a woman's creativity is intended for motherhood:
AGREE__ UNDECIDED__ DISAGREE__
7-4. Generally speaking, a college education is more of a privilege for a
woman than the same education is for a man:
AGREE__ UNDECIDED__ DISAGREE__
QUESTIONNAIRE: ABORTION STATUTES
The purpose of this questionnaire is to give people an opportunity to express
a preference in respect to the creation of legislation having as its subject the
early termination of an unwanted pregnancy.
Which one of the following proposed statutes would you like to see enacted?
Circle the proposed legislation which is the closest expression of your views.
# 1. All statutory restrictions placed upon seeking and obtaining an abortion
shall be declared null and void; the elimination of statutory restrictions
is intended to have the consequence of conferring upon the pregnant
woman the sole responsibility of determining whether or not she shall
terminate her pregnancy.
# 2. All statutory restrictions placed upon a single, unmarried woman who
seeks or obtains an abortion shall be declared null and void; a married
woman who seeks an abortion as a matter of convenience and not as a
matter of preserving her mental or physical health, shall be entitled to a
lawful abortion if and only if her lawful husband consents thereto.
#3. Every woman who seeks to obtain and submits to the use of any means
whatever, with intent thereby to procure her miscarriage; unless the
miscarriage is necessary to preserve her mental or physical health, or
unless there is a strong likelihood that the child might be born deformed,
is punishable by no more than five years imprisonment in the state prison.
#4. Every woman who seeks to obtain and submits to the use of any means
whatever, with intent thereby to procure her miscarriage, unless the same
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is necessary to preserve her physical or mental health, is punishable by
imprisonment in the state prison for no more than five years.
#5. Every woman who seeks to obtain and submits to the use of any means
whatever, with intent thereby to procure her miscarriage, unless the same
is necessary to preserve her life, is punishable by imprisonment etc.
#6. Every woman who seeks to obtain and submits to the use of any means
whatever, with intent thereby to procure her miscarriage, and who in fact
thus terminates an actual pregnancy, has committed a crime punishable by
the penalty of death.
WOULD YOUR PUBLICLY ESPOUSED VIEWS DIFFER FROM
THOSE YOU HOLD IN PRIVATE? YES__ NO___
IF YOU ANSWERED YES, WOULD YOUR PRIVATE VIEWS
TEND TOWARD #1 OR TO #6 AS COMPARED WITH YOUR
PUBLIC VIEWS?
